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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LARRY G, CRENSHAW, JR., minor 
child of LARRY CRENSHAW, 
deceased, and STEPHANIE 
BRIDGEFORTH, 
Applicants-Petitioners, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, UTAH STATE INSURANCE 
FUND and/or ACROPOLIS WHOLESALE, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
Supreme Court No. 20722 
STATEMENT QF ISSUES PRESENTEE ON APPEAL 
1. Did the Industrial Commission err by omitting to 
order the payment of interest on the workers1 compensation 
benefits awarded in a circumstance where the deceased employee and 
its insurance carrier acknowledged liability but could not 
commence compensation payments until apportionment among depen-
dents was determined by the Industrial Commission as there were 
disputes among dependents as to dependency status and apportion-
ment? 
2. Did the Industrial Commission err in fixing peti-
tioners1 attorneys fees at $200.00? 
3. Did the Industrial Commission err in omitting to 
award as a dependent-beneficiary Stephanie Bridgeforth who lived 
with the deceased employee? 
4. Did the Industrial Commission err in its apportion-
ment of benefits between petitioner Larry G. Crenshaw, Jr., and 
Kristen Danielle Crenshaw, two minor children of the deceased 
employee? 
STATEMENT QF FACTS 
Larry G. Crenshaw was killed in a truck accident on 
October 19, 1983, while in the course and scope of his employment 
with Acropolis Wholesale d/b/a/ Chris and Dick's. (R. 1, 4-6). 
Prior to his death, Mr* Crenshaw had resided with his son, 
petitioner Larry Gene Crenshaw, Jr., and the childfs mother, 
petitioner Stephanie Elena Bridgeforth. (R. 9, 34). Mr. Crenshaw 
and Stephanie Bridgeforth, however, were not married and had never 
been married to each other. (R. 2, 55). 
On March 22, 1984, petitioners filed a Claim for 
Dependent's Benefits with the Industrial Commission of Utah. 
(R. 3, 9). Claims were also filed on behalf of Kristen Danielle 
Crenshaw and Sanobi Maki Johnson, two other children born to 
Mr. Crenshaw out of wedlock. (R. 34-37). These two children, 
however, are not parties to the present appeal, though rights of 
Kristen Danielle Crenshaw may be materially affected by the 
decisions of this court. 
After reviewing all of the claims, the Administrative 
Law Judge issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on 
February 15, 1985. The Administrative Law Judge held that Sanobi 
Maki Johnson's claim failed (R. 35) and denied the claim of 
petitioner Stephanie Bridgeforth on the ground that she was not a 
dependent of the decedent. (R. 35). The claims of Kristen 
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Crenshaw and petitioner Larry G. Crenshawf Jr., however, were held 
to be valid claims* (R. 35). 
The Order of February 15, 1985, directed that benefits 
be divided equally between Larry G. Crenshaw, Jr., and Kristen 
Crenshaw. The award was to be paid every four weeks at the 
statutory weekly compensation rate. The Administrative Law Judge 
did not make a provision for any interest on the benefits 
awarded. The Judge also awarded $200.00 for petitioners1 attor-
ney's fees, to be deducted from the award made to Larry G. 
Crenshaw, Jr. (R. 36-37, 40). 
In an Amended Order of March 11, 1985, the Adminis-
trative Law Judge corrected the award to Kristen Crenshaw so that 
the payments of benefits to her would terminate when she reaches 
age 18 on July 6, 1989. (R. 45-47). 
Petitioners filed a Motion for Review on March 26, 
1985. (R. 49-62). Respondents filed their Response to Motion for 
Review on April 4, 1985. (R. 67-72). On May 7, 1985, the 
Industrial Commission issued a Denial of Motion for Review, 
denying petitioners1 Motion for Review and affirming without 
comment the Order of March 11, 1985. (R. 82). 
Petitioners sought review in the Utah Supreme Court in 
June 1985 and submitted their brief on July 25, 1985. (R. 84-85). 
Respondents now submit their reply brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Industrial Commission did not err in omitting 
interest on the benefits awarded, because Section 35-1-78 (as 
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amended, 1981) does not apply to the circumstances of the instant 
case. 
On petitioners1 request for increased attorney's fees. 
State Insurance Fund takes no position except to request the Court 
to advise the parties concerning whether the fees should be 
charged to the apportioned benefits of each dependent or only to 
the dependent(s) for whose benefits the services were rendered. 
Petitioner Stephanie Bridgeforth is not entitled to 
benefits because she is not a dependent under Section 35-1-71 (as 
amended, 1979) and because Otah does not recognize common-law 
marriages entered into in the State of Otah, 
Finally, the Industrial Commission did not err in its 
division of benefits between petitioner Larry G. Crenshaw, Jr., 
and Kirsten Danielle Crenshaw. The division is perfectly just and 
equitable on its face and there is no evidence presented to compel 
a different division. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INDOSTRIAL COMMISSION DID NOT COMMIT ERROR 
BY NOT INCLODING INTEREST ON THE WORKERS1 
COMPENSATION BENEFITS AWARD. 
In Part 4*. of their argument, petitioners urge that the 
award by the Industrial Commission should have included interest 
on the benefits from the date the benefits were due and payable at 
the rate of 8% per year. Petitioners base their argument on Otah 
Code Ann., Section 35-1-78 (as amended, 1981) and Pacheco v. 
Indus, Comm.. 668 P.2d 553 (Otah, 1983). 
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Section 35-1-78 (as amended, 1981) provides in pertinent 
part: 
Awards made by the industrial commission 
shall include interest at the rate of 8% per 
annum from the date when each benefit payment 
would have otherwise become due and payable. 
The question is how this provision should be interpreted. 
Essentially, the question of interpretation is whether the 
interest provision of Section 35-1-78 (as amended, 1981) applies 
to a situation where the liability is acknowledged by the insur-
ance carrier and the delay in payment is caused by the efforts of 
the dependents and alleged dependents to have the Commission 
determine who gets how much. 
The case cited by petitioners/ Pacheco v. Indus. Comm.f 
supra. is of no help for the question at hand. In Pacheco, the 
Utah Supreme Court addressed only the issue of whether the 
interest provision of Section 35-1-78 (as amended/ 1981) applied 
to settlement agreements, as well as compensation awards. The 
Court held that it did not. Pacheco gives no hint as to how the 
present question should be decided. Unfortunately, case law from 
Utah is of only marginal use. Likewise/ Professor Larson provides 
only general points in his treatise and nothing on the point at 
issue here. See: Larson, Vol. 3/ Section 83.42(a)/ (b) and (c). 
Petitioners1 only real argument is that/ based on the 
plain language of the provision/ interest should apply to all 
past-due awards — including awards made past due under the 
conditions of the instant case. Respondents/ however/ suggest 
that the purpose behind the provision must also be considered. 
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The obvious purpose of Section 35-1-78 (as amended, 
1981) is to encourage prompt payment by the employer or its 
insurer of final awards that are due and payable• This purpose, 
however, is not promoted by requiring State Insurance Fund to pay 
out 8% interest on the award amount in the present case* In this 
case, State Insurance Fund is merely a stakeholder, which is and 
has been ready and willing to pay the award to whomever the 
Commission designates as the entitled dependents* The delays in 
payout of the award, which have occurred in this case, have not 
been the fault of State Insurance Fund; and the threat of having 
to pay interest cannot operate as an incentive for State Insurance 
Fund to pay the award more quickly. The Fund must simply wait 
until the Commission determines to whom the award should go after 
all the arguments and appeals by the dependents and alleged 
dependents have been made. Accordingly, Section 35-1-78 (as 
amended, 1981) should not be construed as requiring that the 8% 
interest be paid in this case. 
An Oklahoma case confirms this conclusion. Like the 
instant case, Campbell v. State Indus. Court. 519 P.2d 510 
(Okl. 1974), was a workers1 compensation case involving the 
determination of dependency and apportionment of death benefits. 
After an order was entered on these issues, the employee/insurer 
respondent had no further interest in the case, other than payment 
of the award ordered. Ultimate liability having been established 
in the courtfs order, no further proceeding could increase or 
diminish the extent of that liability, absent an appeal by 
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respondents. Being only a stakeholder in all further proceedings, 
nothing remained for respondents except to pay over the amount 
awarded in conformity with any final order entered. The Oklahoma 
Supreme Court concluded: 
Where an employer/insurer admits liability and 
has no further interest in a proceeding for 
death benefits except as a stakeholder, and to 
pay the total award in compliance with a final 
order, interest is not chargeable against the 
award. The award entered in this case should 
be free from interest. 
519 P.2d at 513. 
In view of the foregoing, the Industrial Commission did 
not err in failing to include interest in this case; and this 
Court should not disturb the Order of the Commission. 
POINT II 
RESPONDENT UTAH STATE INSURANCE FUND TAKES NO POSITION 
ON THE ISSUE OF ATTORNEY'S FEES EXCEPT TO REQUEST THE 
COURT TO ADVISE THE PARTIES TO WHICH OF THE PARTIES THE 
FEE SHOULD BE ASSESSED. 
At Point 6JU of petitioners1 brief, it is urged that the 
attorney for petitioners should have been awarded larger fees by 
the Administrative Law Judge. 
This matter is between the attorney for petitioners and 
the Administrative Law Judge and/or the Industrial Commission. 
Since these attorney's fees come out of the workers1 compensation 
award and do not affect the amount the employer or its insurer is 
required to payf the employer and State Insurance Fund take no 
position on this issue. The State Insurance Fund only requests 
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the court to advise the p a r t i e s concerning which dependent(s) 
should be charged the fee so no dispute will develop. 
POINT I I I 
PETITIONER STEPHANIE BRIDGEPORTH IS NOT 
ENTITLED TO BENEFITS AS A DEPENDENT UNDER UTAH 
WORKERS1 COMPENSATION LAW. 
Though the employer and its insurance carrier's obliga-
tion to pay benefits will not in all likelihood be materially 
affected by a determination that the cohabiting nonspouse of 
the deceased employee is entitled to benefits, in all fairness to 
the minor child who is not represented in this appeal, it is 
appropriate for the employer and its insurance carrier to present 
their interpretation of Utah law on the issue presented in this 
point and Point IV. 
Petitioner Stephanie Bridgeforth is not entitled to 
benefits as a dependent, first, because she was not Mr. Crenshawfs 
wife and does not qualify under Utah Code Ann., Section 35-1-71 
(as amended, 1979), and, second, because common-law marriage is 
not recognized in Utah. 
Section 35-1-71 (as amended, 1979) provides in pertinent 
part: 
The following persons shall be presumed 
to be wholly dependent for support upon a 
deceased employee: 
(2) for purposes of payments to be made 
under subsection (2)(b)(i) of section 35-1-68, 
a surviving husband or wife shall be presumed 
to be wholly dependent upon a spouse with whom 
he or she lived at the time of the employee's 
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he or she l ived at the time of the employee's 
death. 
In a l l o ther c a s e s , the quest ion of 
dependency, in whole or in p a r t , s h a l l be 
determined in accordance with the facts in 
each particular case exist ing at the time of 
the injury or death of such employee, except 
for purposes of dependency reviews pursuant to 
subsection (2) (b) (III) of sect ion 35-1-68. So. 
person shall be considered as a dependent 
unless he or she is a member of the family of 
the deceased employeer or bears the relation 
oil husband or wife, l i n e a l descendent i 
ancestorr or brother or sister 
(Emphasis added). 
The claimant Stephanie Bridgeforth cannot claim depend-
ency under the presumption provided in Section 35-1-71(2), because 
she and Mr. Crenshaw were not married at the time of his fatal 
accident; and thus, she was not a "surviving wife". Accordingly, 
at Point Q*. of their brief, petitioners argue that Stephanie 
Bridgeforth is entitled to benefits either as "a member of the 
family11 or in "the relation of . . . wife" of the decedent, as 
provided in the last paragraph of Section 35-1-71.1 
The last paragraph of Section 35-1-71 requires that two 
different kinds of conditions be met before a claimant may be 
regarded as a legal dependent entitled to benefits. First, it 
must be established that claimant was in fact dependent upon 
decedent for her support, in whole or in part. Second, it must be 
established that the claimant fits within one of the categories 
l"Where there is no presumption of total dependency of a spouse 
or child, fthe question of dependency, in whole or in part, shall 
be determined in accordance with the facts in each particular case 
existing at the time of the injury or death of such employee 
. . . .' Section 35-1-71(2)." Tuom v. Puane Hall Trucking/ 675 
P.2d at 1202-1203. 
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listed: member of the family, relation of wife, lineal decendant, 
ancestor, or brother or sister. Both conditions are necessary. 
Thus, as a hypothetical example, a mere friend of a decedent, to 
whom decedent gave full financial support, would not qualify as a 
legal dependent under the statute, since "friend" is not one of 
the listed categories. As an example of the other condition, a 
sister or brother who received QQ. support from a decedent would 
also not qualify as a dependent under the statute, because she or 
he would not have received any support in fact. 
Respondents1 position is that petitioners have failed to 
establish one or both of the conditions set out in the last 
paragraph of 35-1-71. Petitioners emphasize that the question of 
dependency is to be determined in accordance with the facts in 
each particular case; and, petitioners cite a number of Utah cases 
to support this.2 Yet, petitioners fail to provide relevant 
evidence in their own case. 
There are no affidavits or other evidence in the record 
to support many of the claims made by petitioners on page 11 of 
their brief. Other than petitioners1 own statements in earlier 
briefs, there does not appear to be any independent evidence to 
2utah Galena Corp. v. Indus, Comm., 78 Utah 495, 5 P.2d 242 
(1931) (Person who relies on contributions of worker to maintain 
self according to one's social position); ParK Utah Consolidated 
Mines Co, v. Indus. Comm.. 84 Utah 481, 36 P.2d 979 (1934) (Person 
has reasonable expectation of continuing support); Bradshaw 
v. Indus. Comm. . 103 Utah 405, 135 P.2d 530 (1943) (Dependency 
determined in terms of financial support); Roller Coaster Co. v. 
Indus. Comm., 112 Utah 532, 189 P.2d 709 (1948) (Partial depend-
ency predicated on sonfs contributions of cash, groceries, etc.). 
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support petitioners1 claims that Stephanie Bridgeforth and 
Mr. Crenshaw lived together for three years, that they were 
engaged to get married, or that Stephanie Bridgeforth was depen-
dent upon Mr. Crenshaw for her support. The Administrative Law 
Judge requested such information which was not supplied prior to 
her order, leaving her no alternative but to enter her order 
based on the evidence in the file. In her Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order, the Administrative Law Judge made 
note of the request for evidence. (R. 35). The Administrative 
Law Judge also noted that Stephanie Bridgeforth had gotten married 
after Mr. Crenshawfs fatal accident. (R. 35). Thus, it appears 
that there is no evidence to support petitioners1 claims that (a) 
Stephanie Bridgeforth was in fact partly or wholly supported by 
the decedent, or (b) that she was a "member of the family" of the 
decedent, or (c) that she was in the "relation of wife" with the 
decedent. 
By arguing this point in their brief, petitioners are 
asking the Supreme Court to second guess the Administrative Law 
Judge and the Industrial Commission in the assessment of evidence 
or, in this case, lack of evidence. The standard of review in 
such circumstances is perfectly clear and has been stated many 
times:3 
JUtah Code Ann., Section 35-1-85 (1953, as amended) provides in 
part: "The findings and conclusions of the commission on ques-
tions of fact shall be conclusive and final and shall not be 
subject to review; . • . ." 
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[The Supreme Court] cannot properly reverse 
the Commission and compel an award unless 
there is credible evidence without substantial 
contradiction which points so clearly and 
persuasively in plaintifffs favor that failure 
to so find would justify the conclusion that 
the Commission acted capriciously, arbitrarily 
or unreasonably in disregarding or refusing to 
believe the evidence* 
Folks v. Turner, 22 Utah.2d 122, 449 P.2d 649, 650 (1969). See 
also; Savage v, Indust Comm,# 565 p.2d 782 (Utah, 1977); Kaiser 
Steel Corp, v. Monfredir 631 P.2d 888 (Utah 1981)? state Tax 
Comnu Y. Indust Comm,, 685 p.2d 1051 (Utah, 1984). 
In view of this standard of review and in view of the 
lack of independent evidence in the record, respondents submit 
that this Court should affirm the findings and order of the 
Industrial Commission. 
Even if the facts were established to be as petitioners 
have alleged, Stephanie Bridgeforth would not come within the 
category of "family member" or "relation of wife". 
Petitioners cite the following paragraph from Larson: 
When the dependency statute has utilized 
terms whose legal meaning is less inflexible, 
such as "member of deceased's family" or 
"member of his household," the courts have 
felt more free to adopt a construction that 
will extend protection to the people who need 
it and who were therefore presumably within 
the intention of the framers of the statute. 
The concept of member of the deceased's family 
has often been held to go beyond immediate 
relatives by blood or a marriage. 
Larson, Vol. 2, Section 62.23 (footnote dropped). Petitioners 
offer this citation to support their contention that Stephanie 
Bridgeforth may fit within the category of "family member". 
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However, Larson goes on in his next paragraph to enumerate the 
relations that have been considered "family members"; andr an 
unmarried, co-habiting woman is not among them: 
It has been held to include nephews, 
step-children, and a mother-in-law. It may 
embrace even an unrelated and unadopted child 
if he has in fact been taken into the house-
hold and supported as if he were a relative. 
Thus, dependent status has been extended to 
the nephew and to the grandson of the dece-
dent's concubine. 
Larson, supra. In fact, what Professor Larson does say about an 
unmarried woman who co-habits is rather against petitioners1 
position: 
As to a "wife" under an invalid marriage, 
it has been held that she is a member of the 
family if the relationship was entered in good 
faith, as where the parties# who were immi-
grants unfamiliar with the laws of this 
country, thought they were thoroughly married 
when they bought their marriage license, and 
settled down to a long and respectable married 
life. Butr a woman who knows her go-habita-
tion is illicit may be denied status as a 
member of the familyt for want of the good-
faith elementr while her children living with 
them will be eligible for benefits as members 
of deceasedfs family. 
Larson, gjigxa. (emphasis added, footnotes dropped). Respondents 
invite this Court to review the entire section in Larson. 
Respondents suggest that Larson does not support petitioners1 
position, but, rather, the position of respondents* A copy of the 
section in Larson has been attached as Appendix A for the Court fs 
convenience. 
Respondents note, further, that petitioners fail to cite 
any case in which an unmarried, co-habitating woman has been held 
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to be a "family member" or "wife" or "in relation of wife" for 
purposes of establishing dependency entitling her to benefits 
under workers1 compensation* Petitioners do cite Tuom v. Duane 
Hall Trucking. 675 P.2d 1200 (Utah, 1984); but it is of no help to 
their position. At issue in Tuom was whether the statutory 
presumption of total dependency in Section 35-1-71 applied to an 
Idaho common-law spouse who was not living with the employee at 
the time of the employee's death* The Court held that such a 
spouse would not be entitled to a presumption of total dependency 
for purposes of the death benefit. 675 P.2d at 1202. There was 
no question in fjiom that the claimant was the wife and surviving 
spouse of the decedent employee. The two had "become married in a 
common law relationship in Idaho . . . ." 675 P.2d at 1201. 
Therefore, the spouse was required to show actual dependency, 
which she could not do. 
Petitioners claim the case is important because the 
Court appears to recognize that a common-law wife may qualify as a 
dependent. The answer to this is that a marriage recognized in 
another state, whether common law or otherwise, will be recognized 
in Otah as a matter of full faith and credit and comity between 
sister states. Utah Code Ann., Section 30-1-4 (1953, as amended) 
provides: "Marriages solemnized in any other country, state or 
territory, if valid where solemnized, are valid here." It does 
not follow, however, that Utah itself recognizes common-law 
marriages; and, in fact, it does not. Hendrick v. Anderson, 191 
F.2d 242 (1951); Schurler v. Indus, Comaur 86 Utah 284, 43 p.2d 
14 
696 (1935); In re Vestas' Estate, 110 Utah 187, 170 P.2d 183 
(1946). 
Petitioners point to the fact that the presumption of 
dependency in Section 35-1-71 speaks of a "surviving wife or 
husband"
 f while the language used for all other cases is that of 
bearing "the relation of husband or wife". This slight difference 
in language should not be construed as being of any legal signifi-
cance, however. This language of Section 35-1-71 is a duplication 
of statutory language in the earlier Section 42-1-67, R.S. Utah, 
1933. That language was interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court in 
the case of Schurler Y, Indus, CQIM,, 43 P.2d 696 (Utah 1935), 
where the pertinent part of the statute is quoted. The Schurler 
case, in turn, expanded on two earlier cases, Utah Fuel Co. v. 
M U S » CQfflffl.r et al,, 64 Utah 328, 230 P. 681 (1924) and Sandfiii 
v. Indus. COIIMK, 64 Utah 372, 230 P. 1026 (1924). 
Schurler involved an employee who lived with a woman 
without being married to her. The employee told the woman that he 
wished to marry her, and he and the woman lived together as 
husband and wife. The employee introduced the woman as 
Mrs. Schurler. He bought her a wedding ring and built a home for 
her. The employee lived with the woman, she caring for the home 
and he furnishing the income for them. The woman cared for the 
employee when he was ill and the employee cared for the woman when 
she was ill. The employee secured policies of insurance payable 
to the woman as his wife. The woman executed notes and mortgages 
on real estate and personal property as the employeefs wife. The 
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employee and the woman lived together for approximately 21 years 
as man and wife. When the employee was killed in an industrial 
accident, the woman claimed benefits as the wife and dependent of 
the deceased. 43 P.2d at 697c 
The Schurler Court stateds 
. • . a person living in an illicite relation-
ship with an employee at the time he is killed 
is not a member of his family/ even though the 
two intended to assume, in good faith, the 
marriage relationship. The cases hold that 
there is no moral or legal duty on the part of 
the deceased to support the woman who was not 
married to him, and therefore that the 
applicant was not a member of the decedent's 
familyr even though they lived together under 
the same roof in one community, and in one 
case with a child of the applicant who had 
been incorporated in the community. We have 
sympathy for the applicant's position in this 
case. The unfortunate woman looked upon 
herself as the wife of the decedent, and they 
lived together to all intents and purposes as 
husband and wife. 
43 P.2d at 698. Even in view of its sympathies, the Utah Supreme 
Court was unwilling to interpret the same statutory language as 
involved in the instant case to give benefits to the alleged 
dependent widow in Schurler. 
The situation of Stephanie Bridgeforth in the present 
case is identical to that of the woman claimant in Schurler. 
Therefore, benefits to Stephanie Bridgeforth should be denied. A 
copy of the Schurler case is attached as Appendix B. 
POINT IV 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WAS NOT ARBITRARY OR 
CAPRICIOUS IN ITS DIVISION OF THE AWARD 
BETWEEN KRISTEN AND LARRY, JR. 
At Point IL,. in their brief, petitioners claim that the 
division of benefits between Kristen Danielle Crenshaw and Larry 
G. Crenshaw, Jr., is not just and equitable. Petitioners base 
their argument on two allegations: first, that Kristen received 
much less support from the decedent than did Larry, Jr., and 
second, that Kristen presently has much less need of support than 
does Larry, Jr. 
Respondents note that it could just as well be argued, 
to the contrary, that Kristen, having received less support in the 
past, should be given a larger share of the award now because a 
father has the same duty to support each of his children and his 
past failure to adequately supply that support should be a credit 
for her. Furthermore, it might be pointed out that Larry, 
Jr., will actually receive the larger portion of the award anyway, 
as Kristen fs compensation payments will cease on July 6, 1989, 
when she becomes 18 years old. In view of such counter-consider-
ations, it appears that the Commissions apportionment of the 
award between Kristen Danielle and Larry G., Jr. was reasonable 
and not inequitable. 
No evidence has been offered to support petitioners1 
allegations, however; and no accounting of the relevant financial 
needs has been provided by the petitioners to show any greater 
need on behalf of one child or the other. Petitioners have not 
even provided a financial accounting of the needs of Larry, Jr. 
On July 17, 1985, petitioners did submit a Motion for 
Distribution of Benefits to the Industrial Commission. This 
document is not part of the record; but, a copy is attached 
herewith as Appendix C for the convenience of this Court. A brief 
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examination of this document reveals that petitioners have only 
submitted an account of the combined needs of Stephanie 
Bridgeforth and her son, Larry, Jr. Thus, the only accounting of 
financial needs ever submitted by petitioners in this case is 
irrelevant to and of no help in determining the division of 
benefits between Kristen Danielle and Larry G., Jr. 
In the absence of any relevant evidence on the issue, 
the Industrial Commissions per stirpes division is just and 
equitable on its face. Certainly, in the absence of relevant 
evidence to the contrary, the Industrial Commission has not acted 
arbitrarily or capriciously in dividing the benefits equally. In 
view of the standard of review noted above at Point III, this 
Court should not disturb the Order of the Industrial Commission. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondents respectfully request that the Utah Supreme 
Court provide relief as follows: 
1. That the Order be affirmed in so far as interest on 
the workers1 compensation benefits was not awarded to petitioners. 
2. That the holding of the Order that Stephanie 
Bridgeforth is not a dependent entitled to benefits under Section 
35-1-71 (as amended, 1979) be affirmed. 
3. That the division of the award between Kristen 
Danielle and Larry G., Jr., in the Order be affirmed. 
DATED this ^2(p day of August, 1985. 
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§ 62.23 DEPENDENCY AND DEATH BENEFITS 11-38 
the claimant wife had been living: for sixteen years in a 
meretricious relation with another man,38 and, most clearly 
of all, when nonaccess had been guaranteed by the authorities 
by having had the employee locked up in various federal 
penal institutions during the time the child in question was 
conceived.36 
§ 62.23 Meaning of "member of family" 
When the dependency statute has utilized terms whose 
legal meaning is less inflexible, such as "member of deceased's 
family'' or "member of his household/' the courts have felt 
more free to adopt a construction that will extend protection 
to the people who need it and who were therefore presumably 
within the intention of the framers of the statute. The con-
cept of member of the deceased's family has often been held 
to go" beyond immediate relatives by blood or marriage.37 
It has been held to include nephews,38 stepchildren,39 and 
3 8
 Cairgle v. American Radiator 
& Standard Sanitary Corp., 366 Pa. 
249, 77 A.2d 439 (1951). 
3 6
 Smith v. National Tank Co., 350 
P.2d 539 (Wyo. 1960). The widow 
was awarded benefits on her own be-
half. Another woman claimed bene-
fits on behalf of a son that she alleged 
was sired by the deceased, but the 
claim was disallowed on the ground 
that the boy was illegitimate. The 
widow then applied for dependency 
benefits for her daughter who had 
been conceived when the deceased was 
a nonaccessible inmate of various fed-
eral penal institutions. The court 
construed "stepchild" to include a 
child of the wife's former marriage 
and children acknowledged and taken 
into the home of the employee, but 
could not stretch the definition to in-
clude this daughter, who indeed had 
been the prime evidence on which the 
deceased based his request to the 
parole board for permission to seek 
a divorce. Compensation denied. 
3 7
 Goshorn v. Roger Sherman 
Transfer Co., 131 Conn. 200, 38 A.2d. 
585 (1944); Moore's Case, 294 Mass. 
557, 3 N.E.2d 5 (1936). 
38Thebault v. City of New Or-
leans 136 So. 2d 95 (La. App. 1962). 
The deceased employee had lived in 
his brother's household before and 
after the brother died. The employee 
had contributed $100 per month for 
board and toward the support of his 
deceased brother's children, and had 
provided clothes, medicine, and had 
spent money for the children from 
time to time after his brother's death. 
The murt held that the children were 
partial dependents, but that the wid-
ow of the employee's deceased brother 
was not a dependent. 
3 9
 Duluth-Superior Milling Co. v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 226 Wis. 187, 275 
11-39 STATUTORY RELATIONSHIP CATEGORIES § 62 .23 
a mother-in-law.40 It may embrace even an unrelated and 
unadopted child if he has in fact been taken into the house-
hold and supported as if he were a relative.41 Thus, depen-
dent status has been extended to the nephew 42 and to the 
grandson 4 3 of the decedent's concubine. 
Illegitimate children actually living with deceased are in-
cluded.44 They may be considered members of his household 
or family even though the household is a second one main-
tained with his mistress. In Caddo Contracting Company v. 
X.W. 515 (1937); Smith v. National 
Tank Co., (Wyo.), § 62.22, N. 36 
supra. 
4 0
 Archibald v. Employers' Liab. 
Assur. Corp., 202 La. 89, 11 So. 2d 
492 (1942). 
4
 ' This proviso was not satisfied in 
Boyd v. Publicker Chem. Corp., 118 
So. 2d 684 (La. App. 1960). Within 
a week after birth, the dependent-
claimant was taken into the employ-
ee's home where he remained until 
the employee's wife died. He then 
returned to live at his natural parents' 
home. The employee directly and in-
directly supplied $11 per week for 
the boy. The court held that the 
claimant was not the child, stepchild, 
or adopted child of the deceased em-
ployee nor was he living" in the house-
hold of the deeendent at the time of 
the death. The claimant wa« not a 
dependent within the contemplation 
of the law. Compensation denied. 
Cf. also DeArmond v. Myers 
Gravel & Sand Corp., 142 Ind. App. 
686, 231 N.E.2d 864 (1967). Dece-
dent had filed a petition for adoption 
of two children who had been living 
in his home prior to his death. How-
ever, the adoptions were not final at 
the time he died. Children held not 
entitled to presumption of total de-
pendency. 
4 2
 Patin v. T. L. James & Co., 218 
La. 949, 51 So. 2d 586 (1951). 
4 3
 Associated Indem. Corp. v. In-
dustrial Ace. Comm'n, 132 Cah App. 
2d 56,4, 282 P.2d 519 (1955). Em-
ployee had been living in a meretri-
cious relationship with the maternal 
grandmother of the minor claimant. 
The claimant because of poor health 
had come to California to live with 
Kis grandmother and the employee, 
whom he thought to be his grand-
father. He had lived with them for 
over a year, entirely supported by the 
deceased employee, when the death 
occurred. Since there wer no indica-
tions that this arrangment was to be 
terminated at a certain time, the 
award to claimant was affirmed, even 
though his parents had never aban-
doned him and he subsequently re-
turned to them. 
4 4
 California: Moore Shipbldg. 
Corp. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 185 
Cah 200, 196 P. 257 (1921). 
Louisiana: Thompson v. Vestal 
Lumber & Mfg. Co., 208 La. 83? 22 
(Rel. No. 17—1974) (LWC—Ch. XI) 
§ 62 .23 DEPENDENCY AND DEATH BENEFITS 11-40 
Johnson,45 the decedent divided his time equally between his 
two households, one with his legitimate wife without children, 
and one with his concubine who bore him three illegitimate 
children; neither knew of the existence of the other relation-
ship. . It was held that the maintenance of two different 
households did not alter the fact that he had but one family, 
which included both the legal wife and his dependent illegiti-
mate children. 
As to a "wife" under an invalid marriage, it has been held 
that she is a member of the family if the relationship was 
entered in good faith, as where the parties, who were immi-
grants unfamiliar with the laws of this country, thought they 
were thoroughly married when they bought their marriage 
license, and settled down to a long and respectable married 
life.46 But a woman who knows her cohabitation is illicit 
may be denied status as a member of the family, for want 
of the good-faith element, while her children living with them 
will be eligible for benefits as members of deceased's family.47 
So. 2d 842 (1944); Williams v. 
Jahnke Serv., Inc., 55 So. 2d 668 (La. 
App. 1951); Caddo Contracting Co. 
v. Johnson, 222 La. 796, 64 So. 2d 
177 (1953); Jenkins v. Pemberton, 
87 So. 2d 775 (La App. 1956). 
Michigan: Gates v. Central Foun-
dry Div., Gen. Motors Corp., 349 
Mich. 286, 84 N.W.2d 482 (1957). 
Nebraska: Coppie v. Bowlin 
(Neb.), § 62.22, N. 31 supra. 
4
*222 La. 796, 64 So. 2d 177 
(1953). 
The court did not have to deal with 
the problem,, discussed immediately 
below, of the rights of the mother of 
the illegitimate children, since she 
claimed compensation only on their 
behalf. 
4 6
 Temescal Rock Co. v. Industrial 
Ace. Comm'n, 180 Cal. 637, 182 P. 
447 (1919). 
Contra, Armstrong v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 161 Wis. 530,154 N.W. 844 
(1915). 
4 7
 Moore Shipbldg. Corp. v. In-
dustrial Ace. Comm'n, 185 Cal. 200, 
196 P. 257 (1921). 
Waunakee Canning Corp. v. In-
dustrial Comm'n, 268 Wis. 518, 68 
N.W.2d25 (1955). Though invalidity 
of marriage barred mother's recovery, 
a minor child, who was living with his 
parents and was dependent on his 
father, was awarded compensation. 
However, see comments on this case 
in Zschock v. Industrial Comm'n, 11 
Wis. 2d 231,105 N.W.2d 374 (1960). 
Humphreys v. Marquette Cas. Co., 
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Board and the mandate is clearly to do that 
which is contrary to the intent and purpose 
of the act of admission and the constitution/* 
Counsel have failed to point out wherein 
the statute gives an absolute right of renewal 
notwithstanding the conditions which appar-
ently are attached, as above noted, and, hesi-
tant as courts are to declare a statute uncon-
stitutional, we would not, ordinarily at least, 
want to seek out reasons of our own. This 
is true especially in view of the apparent pur-
pose of the clause that no lease shall be made 
for more than five years. We have not been 
able to conjecture any reasons other than 
that the state may be able to sell the land 
without being subject to any lease, and that 
the rentals may be adjusted from time to 
time, so as to insure the best interests of the 
public. If there are other reasons, they have 
not been suggested. 
(3,4] Furthermore, the general rule is that 
questions not raised In the court below, as 
seems to be true here, cannot be raised on ap-
peal. 4 C. J. 1077. There arc some excep-
tions to that rule. Walter v. Keuthe, OS N. 
J. Law, 823, 121 A. 624. But it has been 
applied to constitutional questions. Case r. 
City of Sullivan, 222 111. 56, 78 N. E. 37; 
Dodge v. Cornelius, 168 N. Y. 242, 61 N. E. 
244. It would seem that it should be applied 
in a case in which a decision on the consti-
tutionality of a statute would affect adverse-
ly a large number of the public, as in the case 
at bar, who have had no opportunity to be 
heard. In this case leases to thousands of 
acres, and hundreds of persons, would be af-
fected. Raising the question in the trial 
court would at least have a tendency to in-
terest all those who would be affected by a 
decision in the case, and to cause the point 
to be argued and presented in this court aa 
thoroughly as possible. So, while not fore-
closing the point in a future case, we cannot, 
we think, hold the law unconstitutional in 
this case. 
It may be of interest to call attention also 
to the Act of Congress, approved February 
15, 1934 (48 Stat. 350), by which the require-
ment of the former act as to leasing is mod-
ified. The recent act provides that the lands 
may, "under such regulations as the legisla-
ture shall prescribe, be leased for mineral, 
grazing, agricultural, or other purposes, pro-
vided that the term of agricultural and graz-
ing leases shall not exceed ten years." This 
act of Congress was accepted, ratified, and 
confirmed by the Legislature of this state by 
chapter 34, Session Laws of 1035. We need 
not decide what effect, if any, this legisla-
tion has on the case at bar. But particularly 
in view of the fact that Thorley's lease has 
not yet run the period of ten years, an addi-
tional reason is furnished why we should 
not, at this time at least, hold the provisions 
for a preference right under section 91-118, 
supra, to be unconstitutional. 
The judgment of the. trial court is, accord-
ingly, affirmed. 
Affirmed. 
!
 KIMBALL, C. X, and RINER, J., concur. 
SCHURLER v. INDUSTRIAL COMMIS-
SION et al. 
No. 5618. 
Supreme Court of Utah, 
April 19, 1935. 
1. Marriage <@=M3 
Only ceremonial marriages, as distin-
guished from common-law marriages, may be 
consummated in Utah., 
2. Master and servant <S=>388 
Woman whose status as deceased em-
ployee's common-law wife began in Utah 
some 20 years before employee's death held 
not within protection of provision of Work-
men's Compensation Act that "wife" is pre-
sumed to be dependent upon husband with 
whom she is living at time of his death (Rev% 
St. 1933, 42-1-67). 
[Ed. Note.—For other definitions of 
"Wife," see Words & Phrases.] 
3. Master and servant <®=»388 
One may be a "member of the family" of 
deceased employee within Workmen's Com-
pensation Act without being a blood relation 
or husband, wife, lineal descendant, ancestor, 
or sister of deceased employee (Rev. St. 1933, 
42-1-67).! 
[Ed. Note.—For other definitions of 
"Mprnber of Family or Household," see 
Words & Phrases.] 
4. Master and servant C=>308 
Woman whose status ns deceased em-
ploy pes common-law wife began in Utah 
^5>For otiier cases ace same topic and KEY NUMBER In all Key Number Digests and Iadexei 
1 Utah Fuel Co. v. Ind. Conim. et al., G4 Utah, 328, 230 P. 081. 
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some 20 years before death of employee, who from where it is thought she went to Call-
remained undlvorced from lawful wife, whose 
whereabouts was unknown, held not entitled 
to compensation for employee's death as a 
"member of the family" of employee (ReVe 
St. 1033, 42-1 07).* 
5. Master and servant <©=>4I6 
Finding that applicant for compensation 
and deceased employee had never been legal-
ly married and that applicant had been living 
with deceased as his common-law wife held 
sufficient to support order denying applicant 
compensation, though compensation was de-
nied on ground that deceased at the time of 
his death was engaged in interstate commerce 
(Rev. St. 1033, 42-l-C7).3 
Original proceeding by Mrs. Madge Sehur-
ler to review an order of the Industrial Com-
mission denying plaintiff compensation under 
the Workmen's Compensation Act for death 
from accidental injury sustained by C. A. 
Schurler in the course of his employment by 
the receiver of the Salt Lake & Utah Rail-
road Company, to which Salt Lake & Utah 
Railroad Company and the Columbia Casual-
ty Company were also made parties. 
Order affiimed. 
Ralph T. Stewart, of Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff. 
Joseph Chez, Atty. Gen., and A. B. Moreton, 
of Salt Lake City, for defendants. 
WOLFE, Justice. 
Certiorari to the Industrial Commission of 
Utah to review an order denying compensa-
tion to the applicant, Mrs. Madge Schurler. I t 
is undisputed that C. A. Schurler was killed 
in the course of his employment on or about 
tlie 11th day of November, 1033, and that his 
employer, the rcceher of the Salt Lake & 
Utah Railroad Company, was an employer of 
more than three employees. The case pre-
sents two questions: (1) Does the applicant 
come under any class of dependents m< hided 
in the Workmen's Compensation Act (Rev. St. 
1033, 42-1-1 et seq.) by either presumption or 
fact? and (2) was the deceased at the time 
of his death engaged in intra or inter state 
commerce? The facts necessary to the solu-
tion of the first question are as follows: 
That in 1010 Mr. Schurler married a wo-
man whose first name was Verna; that 
she deserled him and apparently went 
to Nevada to lire in a house of ill fame, 
fornia and had aot been heard of since; 
that she has been absent from her husband's 
home for more than 7 years, and nothing has 
been learned during or since that time as to 
whether she is living or dead; that on the 
10th day of August, 1911, Schurler instituted 
an action for divorce against Vernn; that 
summons In said action was never served up-
on her; that no divorce decree was ever 
granted; that in 1011, after the desertion by 
Verna, the applicant came to live with the 
deceased for the purpose of keeping house and 
taking care of his mother, who was ill and 
suffering from the effects of an accident. She 
lived in that capacity for approximately a 
year. Applicant was told by deceased that 
he wished to marry her when the divorce was 
obtained. Applicant and deceased agreed to 
be husband and wife; they lived together as 
such, he introducing her as Mrs. Schurler. 
He bought her a wedding ring and built a 
home for applicant and his mother, where 
they lived together as a family, she caring 
for the home and for decedent and his mother, 
and the decedent furnishing the living for the 
three of them until the death of his mother in 
1928. Thereafter decedent continued to sup-
port and live with applicant as his wife. Ap-
plicant nursed decedent when he was ill and 
decedent nursed applicant when she was ill. 
He secured policies of insurance payable to 
her as his wife. She executed notes and 
mortgages on real and personal property as 
his wife. For npproximately 21 years they 
lived together as man and wife. 
The finding of the commission was that they 
were never legally married and that she was 
in fact living with deceased as his common-
law wife, and that she was supported by him 
and dependent upon him for her maintenance 
and support. There were no surviving chil-
dren. The conclusion of the commission was 
that at the time of his death decedent was 
engaged in interstate commerce. The denial 
of compensation was put on this ground and 
not on any conclusion that the applicant was 
not a dependent of deceased as meant by the 
ac t 
[1, 2] In this state a common-law marriage 
cannot be consummated. By that we do not 
mean to say that a common-law marriage con-
summated in a state where it is recognized 
would not be valid here. In this state mar-
riage must be consummated by a ceremony 
as provided by the statutes. There is no 
2 Utah Fuel Co. v. Ind. Comm. et al., 
64 Utah, 328, 230 P. 681; Sanders v. Ind, 
Comm., 64 Utah, 372, 230 P. 1026. 
43 P.(2d)-44% 
3 Utah Fuel Co. v. Ind. Comm. et al., 
64 Utah, 32S, 230 P. 681; Sanders v. Ind. 
Comm., 64 Utah, 372, 230 P. 1026. 
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question, therefore, but that the applicant 
does not come under the class of presumed 
dependents as provided for by section 42-1-67, 
R. S. Utah 1933, providing that the wife shall 
be presumed to be dependent upon the hus-
band with whom she lived at the time of his 
death. The same section goes on to provide: 
"In all other cases, the question of de-
pendency, in whole or in part, shall be deter-
mined in accordance with the facts in each 
particular case existing at the time of the in-
jury resulting in the death to such employee, 
but no person shall be considered as depend-
ent unless he Is a member of the family of the 
deceased employee, or bears to him the rela-
tion of husband or wife, lineal descendant, 
ancestor, or brother or sister.1' 
[3.4] A person, to be a member of the 
family of a decedent within the meaning of 
the partial section just quoted, does not need 
to be a blood relation, nor does such person 
have to bear any of the relationships as set 
out after the word "or" in the above-quoted 
subsection. Utah Fuel Co. v. Ind. Comm. et 
al., 64 Utah, 328, 230 P. 681. The only ques-
tion in this, division of the case is as to wheth-
er Mrs. Schurler can be considered a member 
of the decedent's family as that was meant 
by the Compensation Act. The point seems to 
have been squarely decided in both the cases 
of Utah Fuel Company v. Industrial Commis-
sion, just cited, and Sanders v. Industrial 
Comm., 64 Utah, 372, 230 P. 1026, although the 
facts in each of those cases differed some-
what from the facts here. In the Utahi Fuel 
Company Case the applicant had lived with 
the deceased ostensibly as wife for more than 
6 years prior to the date of the accident. Dur-
ing all that time she had a husband living 
from whom she had not been divorced and 
the deceased had a wife living from whom he 
had not been divorced. In that case there 
was no question but that both the husband 
of the applicant and the wife of the decedent 
were living, whereas, in this case, it is not 
known whether the wife of the decedent was 
living at the time of his death, more than 7 
years having elapsed since the deceased had 
heard from or about her. We shall discuss 
later whether that element changes the legal 
situation. 
In the Sanders Case the applicant obtained 
a divorce from her husband which became 
final on October 25,1923. She was married at 
Evanston, Wyo., to the deceased on June 16, 
1923, before the expiration of 6 months from 
the filing of the interlocutory decree. The de-
ceased and the applicant purposely went to 
Wyoming to avoid the effect of the 6 months' 
provision. The court held that the marriage 
was void and that the deceased, who was 
killed on March 8,1924, less than a year after 
the pretended marriage to the applicant, had 
been living in an adulterous relationship. 
The Sanders Case differs from the present 
case in the fact that the parties intentionally 
went to Wyoming in order that they would 
not have to wait the required 6 months. At 
the time of the pretended marriage ceremony 
the applicant in that case had an undivorced 
husband living. In both cases above dis-
cussed compensation was denied. 
The applicant in this case admits that, in 
order to find for her, the principle laid down 
in the two Utah cases above discussed would 
have to be abandoned by this court, because 
the principle in both of those cases is to the 
effect that a person living in an illicit rela-
tionship with an employee at the time he is 
killed is not a member of his family, even 
though the two intended to assume in good 
faith the marriage relationship. The cases 
hold that there is no moral or legal duty on 
the part of the deceased to support the woman 
who was not married to him, and therefore 
that the applicant was not a member of the 
decedent's family, even though they lived to-
gether under the same roof in one community, 
and in one case with a child of the applicant 
who had been incorporated in the community. 
We have sympathy for the applicant's posi-
tion in this case. The unfortunate woman 
looked upon herself as the wife of decedent, 
and they lived together to all intents and pur-
poses as husband and wife. In fact, they 
were just as much a social unit as a de jure 
family. They were de facto a social unit. 
Our society is made up largely of social units 
called families. Where two persons live to-
gether such as these did and perhaps liave 
children, there is much to be said in favor of 
treating them in law as a family, at least for 
purposes of compensation. But we are un-
willing in the light of the cases already de-
cided by this court to change the principle 
therein laid down. Those decisions do not 
rest alone upon morals. Illegality is not 
necessarily immorality. In other states, com-
mon-law marriages are recognized, and we 
would not say that people who have con-
scientiously lrved together in such relation-
ship in those states are less moral than those 
who have gone through the marriage cere-
mony, although in our state the ceremony is 
most necessary. Certainly, many cases may 
be shown where a man and woman have lived 
together as de facto man and wife during i 
their lives and have been more moral than 
SCHURLER v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
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those who hare lived together as de jure man 
and wife. 
The two Utah cases above discussed are 
based on grounds of public policy rather than 
on the pure ground of morals. The theory 
which lies behind tbem is that it is better to 
deny compensation to a person in Mrs. Schur-
ler's position than it is to open the door to 
the entrance of cases where applicants living 
in meretricious relationships may build up 
situations to show themselves as a member of 
a family if such membership can grow out of 
or be built around an illicit relationship. 
In this case this relationship between the 
parties had its inception at the time when the 
wife of the decedent was living. She may be 
still living. There is evidence that the de-
cedent pointed out his wife to the applicant 
while they were out walking together. This 
was before the wife completely disappeared 
from the scene. It is contended by the ap-
plicant that, while the relationship had its 
laceptlon while the wife of the decedent was 
known to be living, yet there is a presumption 
of death, because she has not been heard of 
for more than 7 years, and that therefore, at 
least long before the decedent died, it must 
be presumed that he was not living in an 
adulterous relationship. But the decision 
must rest, not upon the presence or absence 
of an adulterous relationship, but upon the 
specific point that, for the purpose of com-
pensation in this case, an applicant cannot be 
a member of a man's* family where that so-
called family membership arises out of or ex-
ists by virtue of cohabitation with him in a 
nonmarital relationship. We cannot presume 
that after all these years the membership in 
the family would have continued without this 
relationship because at the beginning it was 
said to be free from such relationship. The 
fact is that it did exist at the time of the 
death because of such relationship. 
The defendants have cited, among others, 
the cases of Me ton v. State Ind. Insur. Dept., 
104 Wash. 652, 177 P. 696; Hail v. Ind. 
Comm., 165 Wis. 364, 162 N. W. 312, L. R. A. 
1917D, 829; Green v. Green (Tex. Civ. App.) 
235 S. W. 980; Scott v. Independent Ice Co., 
135 Md. 343, 109 A. 117; Meehan v, Edward 
Valve & Mfg. Co., 65 Ind. App. 342, 117 N. E. 
265; Brown v. Long Mfg. Co., 213 Mich. 
221, 182 N. W. 124. These cases are not 
strictly in point, because in none of the states 
where they were decided was there any pro-
vision that a member of the family who was 
actually dependent, independent of blood re-
lationship or bpouseship, was entitled to 
compensation. In the last case it was a 
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question of whether a boy born of what was 
alleged to be a common-law marriage, but 
which was held by the court not to be, was 
a lineal descendant within the meaning of the 
net. But the cases of Armstrong v. Ind. 
Comm, of Wisconsin, 161 Wis. 530, 154 N. W. 
844; Memphis Fertilizer Co. v. Small, 160 
Tenn. 235, 22 S.W.(2d) 1037; Baldwin v. 
Sullivan, 201 Iowa, 955, 204 N. W. 420, 208 N. 
W. 218; Industrial Comm. of Ohio v. Dell, 
104 Ohio St. 389, 135 N. E. 669, 34 A. L. R. 
422, involved statutes whereunder it was per-
missible to grant compensation to a member 
of a decedent's family although not related 
to the decedent by blood or marriage. 
The California case of Temescal Rock: Co. 
v. Ind. Ace. Comm., ISO Cal. 637, 182 P. 447, 
448, 13 A. L. R. 683, and Louden v. Ind. Ace. 
Comm., 105 Cal. App. 65, 286 P. 1045, cited by 
applicant, are in essence contrary to the line 
of cases last above mentioned. In the first 
California case cited applicant and deceased 
were ignorant persons of Spanish nativity. 
They believed thomselves married because 
they got a license to marry and then lived to-
gether as man and wife. It was in effect a 
common-law marriage. Common-law mar-
riages were not recognized in California at 
that time, and yet the court held that the ap-
plicant was "in good faith a member of the 
family or household." In the Louden Case ap-
plicant and deceased married "Indian way," 
which really amounted to a common-law mar-
riage. There the court held that she was a 
member in good faith of the employee's house-
hold. These cases cannot be distinguished 
from the contrary holding cases purely on the 
ground that the words "good faith" and the 
word "household" are used in the act. Even 
under the Utah act a person who was depend-
ent upon the deceased employee and was 
claiming on the basis of being a member of the 
family would have to be a member in good 
faith. Such words would be read into the act. 
"Household" appears to mean a family resid-. 
ing under one roof. Had that word been used 
in the Utah act, the decision in the Utah Fuel 
Company and the Sanders Cases would have 
been the same, because those cases were based 
upon the theory that one could not classify 
himself as a member of the family through 
the assumption of an illicit relationship. 
True, in both California cases no adulterous 
relationship was in%*olved. Perhaps, if there 
had been, the cases might have held the rela-
tionship was not in "good faith," but that 
would have been reading into the term "good 
faith" what at times might be a mere techni-
cal breach of standardized morality. Had this 
question come before us now for the first time, 
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we might lay down a different rule. But 
this court having in two cases established the 
rule as it now exists, we must abide the 
pleasure of the Legislature to express the in-
tention that a different rule should prevail. 
[5] Holding as we do on the first question 
stated at the beginning of this opinion, it is 
unnecessary for us to consider the second 
question. The commission based its conclu-
sion and order upon the finding that C. A. 
Schurler was engaged in interstate commerce 
at the time of his death, and therefore that 
it did not have jurisdiction. But its third 
finding sets out that the "record disclosed the 
decedent and applicant were never legally 
married and that she was in fact living with 
him as his common law wife." Therefore the 
findings are sufficient to support the order 
denying compensation, although the conclu-
sion is based on a different finding. In a 
sense, the finding that the applicant and de-
cedent were living in a common-law marriage 
relationship is itself a conclusion. It would 
be difficult to see what more could be put in 
the eonchision except the concluding phrase 
that the claim had to be dismissed, which is 
already there except that it follows from a 
different basis. 
The order of the Industrial Commission 
denying compensation is affirmed on the 
ground that the applicant is not a dependent 
within the meaning of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act; costs to defendants. 
ELIAS HANSEN, C. J., and FOLLAND, 
EPHRAIM HANSON, and MOFFAT, JJ., con-
cur. 
tain finding, could not be considered in ab-
sence of transcript of evidence. 
2. Appeal and error <®=*907(2) 
In absence of evidence, presumption is 
that evidence supports finding. 
3. Trial <&»39l 
Trial court must make findings on all 
material issues raised by pleadings.! 
4. Appeal and error <3=»I071 (6) 
Trial court's failure to make finding re-
garding undenied allegation in answer held 
harmless, where only one finding was possible 
and finding, if made, would not have affected 
judgment, and hence new trial would be fu-
tile.2 
5. Appeal and error <§=>I232 
Where undertaking on appeal to district 
court from city court's judgment for plain-
tiff in automobile accident case provided that, 
if judgment or any part thereof was affirmed, 
defendant would pay amount thereof, sure-
ties held not released by reversal of district 
court's judgment for plaintiff where, on sec-
ond trial, plaintiff recovered judgment for 
same amount and no appeal was taken there-
from (Rev. S t 1933, 20-4-18, 104-77-6). 
•»»C*SYSTtA 
Appeal from District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Third District; Hon. Allen G. Thur-
man, Judge. 
Action by J. C. Piper against Ezra T. 
Hatch and another. Judgment for plaintiff, 
and defendants appeal 
Affirmed. 
J. D. Skeen and E. J, Skeen, both of Salt 
Lake City, for appellants. 
J. J. Whitaker, of Salt Lake City, for re-
spondent 
PIPER v. HATCH et al. 
No. 5540. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 10, 1035. 
I. Appeal and error @=»694(l) 
In action against sureties on undertaking 
on appeal, assignments of errors stating that 
there was no strict compliance with under-
taking, and that evidence did not support cer-
MOFFAT, Justice. 
This is an appeal upon the judgment roll. 
Neither party has furnished us with what 
may be regarded as a* statement of facts, and 
we are compelled to rely upon the pleadings 
and such statements as we have been able to 
glean from the briefs of appellants and re-
spondent. We are able, however, to con-
struct out of what is here the following: J. 
C Piper, the plaintiff in this action, com-
menced an action in the city court of Salt 
Lake City on the 10th day of December, 1920, 
l Piper v. Enkle, 78 Utah, 342, 2 P. 
(2d) 900; Dillon Implement Co. v. 
Cleavclnnd, 32 Utah, 1, 88 P. 070; Thom-
as v. Chi} ton Piano Co., 47 Utah, 91, 
151 P. 543; Mitchell v. Jensen, 29 Utah, 
34(>, 81 P. 1G5; Thomas v. Farrell, 82 
Utah, 535, 2G P.(2d) 328. 
* I. X. L. Stores Co. v. Moon, 49 Utah, 
2G2, 102 P. 622. 
APPENDIX C 
JOSEPH H. GALLB30S, #1143 
MICHAEL R. SCIUMBATO, #2894 
GALLEQOS & SCIUMBATO 
Attorneys for Larry G. Crenshaw, Jr. 
and Stephanie Bridgeforth 
333 South Denver Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-6522 
hECEIVED 
JUL2 21SS5 
State ln*uranc» Fund 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
KRISTEN D. CRENSHAW, SANOBI MAKI 
JOHNSON, and LARRY G. CRENSHAW, JR., 
minor children of LARRY G. CRENSHAW, 
deceased, and STEPHANIE BRIDGEFORTH, 
Applicants, 
vs. 
ACROPOLIS WHOLESALE and/or 
{JIM STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Defendants, 
MOTION FOR DISTRIBUTION 
OF BENEFITS 
Case No. 84000267 
COMES NOW Applicants Larry G. Crenshaw, Jr. , and Stephanie 
Bridgeforth , and hereby respectful ly move this Honorable Coamission to 
enter i t s Order allowing distribution of the sum of at lecist $200.00 per 
month from the award heretofore made to Larry G. Crenshaw, Jr . , to assist 
Applicant Stephanie Bridgeforth with the care, support and maintenance of 
Larry G. Crenshaw, J r . . In support thereof, the Applicants state and 
represent t o the Honorable Commission and Administrative Law Judge as 
follows: 
1. That the Coamission heretofore awarded the sum of $38,858.08 
t o Larry G. Crenshaw, J r . , as the surviving dependent son of Larry G. 
Crenshaw, deceased, as and for workmen's compensation benefits. The 
Commission ordered that said benefits be paid into a Utah State Employees 
C r e d i t Union accoun t a t the ra te of $121.34 per week a t intervals of not 
less than every four weeks. 
2. That Stephanie Bridgeforth, the mother of Larry G. Crenshaw, 
J r . , i s unemployed. She r e c e i v e s $464.00 p e r month Social Security 
b e n e f i t s t o a s s i s t he r wi th t h e support of Larry G. Crenshaw, J r . , and 
$102.00 per month AFDC payments as and for the support of a neice who l ives 
with her. 
Applicant has present monthly living expenses as follows? 
a. Food and household supplies . . . . . . . $300.00 
b. Telephone . . . . . . . . « . . . . . . . $ 60.00 
c« Laundry and cleaning . . . . . e . . . . . $ 15.00 
d. Clothing • . . . . • . • . . « « , . • € c «$ 80.00 
e. Insurance . . , . * • • . • $ 10.00 
f. Auto expense • .$240.00 
g. Entertainment . . . . • . . . . . . . . . $ 85.00 
h. Incidentals $ 70.00 
i. Auto payments $230.00 
j. Monthly debt service . . . . . . . . . . .$420.92 
TOTAL . . . . . . . . . • • . ' • . . . .$1510.92 
3. That Applicant Stephanie Bridgeforth i s in need of payments 
from t h e b e n e f i t s h e r e t o f o r e awarded in the sum of a t leas t $200.00 per 
month t o a s s i s t he r wi th the support, care and maintenance of Applicant 
Lar ry G. Crenshaw, J r . , the surviving dependent son of Larry G. Crenshaw, 
d e c e a s e d . The monthly expenses incurred for the care and maintenance of 
Lar ry G. Crenshaw, J r . , g r e a t l y exceed t h e Social Security benefits 
r e c e i v e d for s a i d c h i l d , and t h e income of t h e spouse of Applicant 
Stephanie Bridgef orth is insufficient to meet the monthly expensec of the 
Applicants, 
WHEREFORE Applicants Larry G* Crenshaw# Jr . , and Stephanie 
Bridgef orth hereby respectful ly move this Honorable Commissions and the 
Adminis trat ive Law Judge to enter i t s Order directing the distribution of 
the sum of at least $200.00 per month front he benefits heretofore awarded 
t o Applicant Larry G. Crenshaw, Jre , to Stephanie Bridgeforth, to ass ist 
her with the care, maintenance and support of Larry G. Crenshaw, Jr.• 
DATED THIS / 7 m day of July, 1985. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GALED30S & SCIUMBATO 
Michael R. Sci/umbato 
Attorney for Applicants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, the undersigned hereby certify that I mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR DISTRIBUTION OF BENEFITS, 
first-class postage prepaid, this //it'] day of July, to the following: 
Dennis V. Lloyd, Esq. Lee Bennion 
State Inurance Fund State Insurance Fund 
560 South 300 East 560 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Irene M. Johnson Mrs. Amanda Crenshaw 
1221 West 700 South 454 South 1000 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84104 Salt Lake City, Utah 84104 
Debra Leggrone Utah State Employees Credit Union 
1165 Chesterdale #B Attn: David Abbott 
Cincinnati, Ohio 45246 Post Office Box 45001 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
